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March 5, 1975  
(Revised)

## FY 1975 KIQ STRATEGY REPORT

KIQ 1: *What major trends and changes are likely in Soviet foreign policies relating to the US? Include the Soviet perception of the level, nature, and geographic focus of the competition with the US.*

- I. This KIQ is unusually broad, and much of the work relevant to it will be covered directly under KIQs 2 through 6. The following cluster of amplifying questions is specific to this KIQ.
  - A. How do the Soviets read US intentions toward the USSR? How do the Soviets evaluate US strengths and weaknesses as a competitor with the USSR? What implications for themselves do they see in the US executive-legislative balance of power, and the upcoming presidential campaign and election? What are Soviet objectives vis-a-vis the US? What is the role of military power in Soviet foreign policy?
  - B. What effects are external problems, e.g., the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, having on the Soviet view of the US-USSR bilateral relationship? What is the effect of the Sino-Soviet conflict on Moscow's

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
behavior toward the US? In such third-area problems, what important burdens does the maintenance of US-Soviet detente impose on Soviet policy? What opportunities does it confer? The reverse is equally important: what third-area burdens or opportunities are so important that they might lead Moscow to alter its policy toward the US?

- C. In which of the above areas are significant differences of leadership opinion plausible, probable, or demonstrable?

## II. COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS STRATEGY

- A. As for collection, these questions rest on intangibles, and collectable materials for answers will

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tions.

- B. The analytic work required is primarily a continuation of long-standing efforts. In addition, we will

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increase the analytic work on Soviet decision-making in foreign policy in order for the US to better understand and if possible to predict and influence Soviet choices.

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2. The impact on bilateral Soviet-US relations of third-country problems, will be examined in a revised NIE 11-10-75, which will be completed in the second half of FY 1975. Implications for the US of Soviet Policy Toward Southern Europe will underlie NIAM 11/20-1-75.

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## FY 75 KIQ STRATEGY REPORT

KIQ 2: *What internal trends and developments are likely to affect Soviet behavior, both in the near and long terms?*

I. This is a long-term problem requiring research efforts extending over a number of years. Some of the salient topics are:

- A. The leadership -- in the short run, its stability in the light of doubts about Brezhnev's durability and the process of the upcoming 25th Party Congress; areas of significant agreement and disagreement; in the longer run, the characteristics of the next generation, including policy views and internal groupings.
- B. Economic management -- the distribution of elite opinion on the questions of Western involvement in the Soviet economy, improved centralized administration, and decentralization; the role of regional and enterprise economic managers vis-a-vis centralized economic control.
- C. The potential for pluralism -- at the policymaking level, this means primarily the involvement of addi-

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tional institutions; at the sociopolitical level, the degree of autonomy and integrity available to such groups as the professions, and the nationalities.

## II. COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS STRATEGY

### Collection

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While internal Soviet trends and developments have high priority in all these collection systems, increased dialogue between collectors and analysts and tailored requirements will be required because of the importance of understanding Soviet political and policy process (beyond fact and event) to a quality performance on this KIQ.

### Analysis

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


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in the second quarter of FY 1975 a paper on the spectrum of elite opinion concerning centralization vs. decentralization.

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D. Finally, the NIO remains concerned that heavy demands for current intelligence support of policy and other research priorities result in insufficient intelligence community analytical talent being devoted to research and in-depth analysis on important Soviet internal political matters.

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## FY 75 KIQ STRATEGY REPORT

KIQ 3: *What are the policies and activities of the Soviet Union with respect to maintaining and expanding its influence in Eastern and Western Europe, the Middle East, and the Indian Ocean?*

### I. MORE SPECIFICALLY

#### A. In Eastern Europe:

1. What are the Soviets doing to enforce political, military and economic integration and conformity in Eastern Europe? How successful are these efforts?

#### B. In Western Europe:

1. What is the present Soviet analysis of Western Europe? How do the Soviets hope to encourage those trends which they favor and to block those which they oppose?
2. How are the Soviets likely to respond to recent developments in southern Europe, including changes on the Iberian peninsula; prospects for communist participation in the governments of Italy, Portugal, Greece and possibly Spain;

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a more palatable Greek government; the stress of conflict in Cyprus on the USSR's Turkish, Cypriot and Greek equities; the increased disarray in NATO stemming from the Cyprus situation?

C. In the Middle East and India:

1. What are Soviet policy and activity with respect to an Arab-Israeli settlement; Soviet efforts otherwise to recoup lost influence in Egypt?
2. Are the Soviets providing advanced weapons to states in the area with the intent and effect of altering the local power balance? What are Soviet plans and progress in obtaining military access and facilities in the area?
3. What significant changes may occur in Soviet relations with India; with Iran, Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and the Palestinians; with Israel?
4. What is the Soviet attitude toward the possibility of another Middle East war?

II. COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS STRATEGY

- A. All collection techniques and sensors will collect on this KIQ, with increased reporting especially on

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


B. In analytic terms, efforts will be concentrated on current intelligence and policy support work, such

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upcoming Soviet-FRG summit and various papers which will be required on Middle East peace negotiations.



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21 August 1975

STRATEGY REPORT FOR KIQ #4

KIQ #4: In the Sino-Soviet relationship, what are the capabilities, intentions, and expectations of the two sides -- conflict, confrontation, accommodation, or continued uneasy stalemate?

Amplification:

How do the Soviets and the Chinese each now view their triangular relationship with the US? How does each perceive the leverage to <sup>be disrupted,</sup> run, and on what issues? \*

How will the US withdrawal from Indochina affect Sino-Soviet competition in these areas? How, particularly, will the USSR and China each perceive its various equities and opportunities in Korea and in Japan?

Collection Strategy:

What sources and mechanisms does each side have to view, evaluate and influence the other?

What views of the other party are held by key individuals and groups in the Chinese and Soviet leaderships?

How confident are the Soviets in their knowledge of the precise locations of Chinese missile sites and of the pace of Chinese weapons development?

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## FY 75 KIQ STRATEGY REPORT

KIQ 4: *What are the capabilities, intentions, and expectations of the two sides in the Sino-Soviet relationship -- confrontation, reconciliation, or continued uneasy stalemate?*

Include reporting on significant qualitative or quantitative changes in the military balance between the USSR and China, as it exists and as it is perceived by the antagonists.

### I. COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS STRATEGY

- A. The community will collect, primarily through satellite photography and secondarily through COMINT, information on changes in the Sino-Soviet military balance. Information on the intentions and expectations of the two sides will come chiefly from human sources (foreign service, clandestine, attache and also military service overt collection) and COMINT.
- B. The Community will be alert, not only to the possibility of a further political deterioration and/or military action, but to the possibility of an upturn in Sino-Soviet relations, particularly if Mao should pass from the scene. A close watch will be kept for any signs of new overtures from either side and for

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any reliable indications of how the Soviets view the  
leading personalities and likely policies of post-Mao

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will continue its ongoing Bayesian analysis of the  
likelihood of hostilities and the level of tension.

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## FY 75 KIQ STRATEGY REPORT

KIQ 5: *What are Soviet economic policies toward the developed West? Particular attention should be given to importation of technology. Large-scale trade in food and materials is also important.*

### I. COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS STRATEGY

#### A. The key collection needs are:


1. Information on the current and prospective transfer of advanced technological information and products, particularly those with potential military application, to the USSR from the US and other countries.
2. Continuing efforts to acquire advance information on changes in short-run Soviet intentions in foreign trade, particularly in agricultural products, and the USSR's foreign exchange position.
3. Information on Soviet long-run planning for technology inputs, joint development projects, and foreign trade in agricultural products, energy, and raw materials.
4. The Soviet view of world economic problems: im-

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plications for Soviet interests, Moscow's propensity to exploit Western troubles or to seek co-operative solutions.

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will be sought in open sources and in US-Soviet bilateral exchanges.

C. The key analytic requirements are:

1. Estimating the degree of Soviet success in obtaining technology of military value and translating it into specific military gains.
2. Estimating the effectiveness of Soviet assimilation of foreign technology.
3. Analyzing Soviet alternatives to US suppliers in the technological field.

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4. Analyzing the role of technological policy in Soviet internal debate and detente policy.
  5. Responding to ad hoc requests for analysis of particular proposals, e.g., individual joint development schemes.
- D. With respect to (1), the Scientific Intelligence Committee of the USIB will produce a study in the second quarter of FY 1975 on the military applications of

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selective service inputs will continue to develop  
military-related intelligence on the economic, tech-  
nical, and strategic implications of technology

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## FY 75 KIQ STRATEGY REPORT

KIQ 15: *What progress are the Soviets making in expanding their international political influence through the use of their distant fleet operations and sea-power presence?*

### I. COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS STRATEGY

A. This KIQ calls for a close examination of how well the Soviets are doing in pursuit of their political objectives in third-world areas by using the navy as a political instrument. It will be addressed in NIE 11-15-74, and also in NIE 11-10-75. The latter will in addition consider the other instruments of Soviet policy in the Third World, in the second half of FY 1975.

B. In collection terms, the community will continue to collect the data on Soviet naval activities in distant areas, of the kind presented in Annexes B and C

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on political reactions and trends in the countries chosen for detailed analysis.

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## FY 75 KIQ STRATEGY REPORT

KIQ 30: *What are the prospects for Yugoslavia following the departure of Tito?*

Consider especially the potential political role of the armed forces, and Soviet efforts to increase influence.

### I. COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS STRATEGY

A. Principal collection contributors are likely to be:  
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
B. On the general post-Tito scene, a SNIE will be produced immediately upon Tito's departure, addressing prospects for the first 6-12 months of the new regime. It will include a list of indicators to provide alerting to any subsequent phase of major changes in post-Tito Yugoslavia.

C. In a more intensive analytical focus of the political views and associations of the Yugoslav armed forces, CIA will produce a research study of the Yugoslav party, army and state. Several specialized

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25X1A studies of aspects of Yugoslav armed forces' effec-



selected members of the Yugoslav high command.

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March 7, 1975

## FY 75 KIQ STRATEGY REPORT

KIQ 39: *What indications are there of internal and regional instability in South Asia, especially concerning India?*

## I. COMMUNITY COLLECTION AND PRODUCTION STRATEGY

The principal types of information on which a continuous flow of reporting is desired during the fiscal year are:

- A. Information on the role, objectives, and prospects of the USSR and China in South Asia. (Although KIQ #3 addresses the issue of Soviet policies and activities in the Indian Ocean area, this subject would also be handled under this KIQ insofar as it relates to the stability or instability of South Asia.
- B. Information on regional disputes in South Asia and their implications for the US, specifically India-Pakistan relations, Pakistan-Afghanistan relations, and Indian intentions in the event of a change of government in Bangladesh.
- C. Future nuclear plans of India and Pakistan and their implications for the US. (Although this subject is treated in part in KIQ #64 on nuclear proliferation, it is also included here since it clearly has a potential for causing instability in South Asia.)

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
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- D. Information on changes in the conventional military capabilities of India, Pakistan and Afghanistan as they relate to the regional disputes of the area, as well as foreign military assistance to these nations.
- E. Economic conditions in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh and their implications for the US, including likely demands on the US for increased assistance.
- F. Political developments which may affect internal and regional stability in South Asia, particularly in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, and their implications for the US.

II. AGENCIES WORKING ON THIS KIQ

A. Collection

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ing India and Pakistan.

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
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
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
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impact of economic problems in the military arena.

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also provide a limited input on this target.


B. Production

1. The production of intelligence on South Asia tends to be responsive in nature, reflecting in part the relative low priority of the area to US policy makers. Instead, the emphasis is on responding to requests and on covering developments as they unfold. The latter is generally handled in the regular production vehicles

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2. In addition to the ad hoc intelligence production on South Asia, there are several national level intelligence products which are either already underway or anticipated. These are:

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- a) Interagency Memorandum on "Pakistani Defense Capabilities." This memorandum addresses the military balance among Pakistan, India and Afghanistan. The first draft is undergoing consultation with the field; the final study is due early in fourth quarter of 1974.
- b) "The South Asian Military Handbook" (Second Edition). An interagency product which is to be disseminated in early October.
- c) Interagency memorandum on "Prospects and Implications of a Change of Government in Bangladesh." Tentative for fourth quarter of 1974.
- d) NIE on "Prospects for Stability in South Asia and the Implications for the US". Tentative target for first or second quarter of 1975.

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following external research projects on South Asia:

- a) "India's Nuclear Capability: Effect on Great Power Policies"
- b) "Political Implications of South Asian Malthusian Nightmare"

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### III. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT

In two specific areas, the National Intelligence Officer makes the following recommendations:

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the primary collection of the CIA/DDO in South Asia should continue to be focused on external matters (e.g., the Soviet and Chinese targets).

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## FY 75 KIQ STRATEGY REPORT

KIQ 40: *What are Communist intentions and capabilities in Indochina and Thailand?*

*Are the USSR and/or China willing to support major hostilities, particularly on the part of the North Vietnamese?*

*What are Soviet and Chinese interests in the area?*

### I. COMMUNITY COLLECTION AND PRODUCTION STRATEGY

A. Collection. The principal types of information on which a continuous flow of reporting is desired during the fiscal year are:

1. Orders and instructions passed by the North Vietnamese leadership to Communist cadres in South Vietnam. Similar orders and instructions to NVA forces in Laos and Cambodia.
2. Information on NVA military capabilities, particularly infiltration to the south or any other movements of North Vietnamese military forces within Indochina; on NVA logistic movements within Indochina; also on NVA training and conscription programs within North Vietnam.

KIQ 40 - 1

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3. Information on the types and quantities of military materiel and economic goods which the Soviet Union and China provide North Vietnam.
4. Information on Khmer Communist military and political plans, activities and capabilities.
5. Information on Lao Communist military and political plans, activities and capabilities.
6. Any indications of significant changes in the level of assistance to the Thai Communists provided by North Vietnam, China or the USSR.
7. Overt statements, and statements made in diplomatic channels by the North Vietnamese, Chinese, and Soviets concerning their policies in Indochina and Thailand.

B. Production. The following types of intelligence analysis and production will be needed to fulfill this KIQ during the fiscal year:

1. Ad hoc current analysis and reporting on all aspects of this KIQ in the community's daily and weekly publications, and in the form of special memoranda and briefings, will be a high priority requirement throughout the year.

KIQ 40 - 2

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3. Three (possibly more) in-depth analyses of North Vietnamese political and military capabilities and intentions vis-a-vis South Vietnam (e.g., National Intelligence Estimates or Interagency Memoranda) will be required.
3. Biweekly reports to the NSC Staff on Communist military activity in Indochina, infiltration, and logistic developments will be required.
4. Quarterly analyses of Communist order of battle down to the regimental level in North and South Vietnam and in Cambodia. In Laos, the state of our information will not allow us to do order of battle analyses below the divisional level.
5. Two (possibly more) National Estimates or Interagency Memoranda on the situation in and prospects for Cambodia will be required during the year.
6. Two (possibly more) Interagency Memoranda will have to be prepared on the extent of Soviet and Chinese military and economic aid to North Vietnam.
7. One (possibly more) Interagency Memoranda may be required on the capabilities, intentions, and foreign support of the Communist insurgencies in Thailand.

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
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II. AGENCIES WORKING ON THIS KIQ

25X1A A. Collection



category #7.

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mation needed to produce longer-term and less timely  
estimates of military aid to North Vietnam.

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
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
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
25X1A sibility for collection on category #4.



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KIQ are secondary to those of other agencies.

B. Production



the analysis and production requirements listed  
in section I(B) above.


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


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I(B). (For additional comment on category #2,  
see item directly below.)

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information on Communist military activity, infiltration, logistic developments, and order-of-battle will be less detailed and less timely. Our confidence in our judgments on military activities and infiltration will be marginally diminished, and on logistic developments and order-of-battle considerably diminished. This diminished confidence, in turn, will also affect our analyses under category #2 -- in-depth

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studies of North Vietnamese capabilities and intentions. Nevertheless, the confidence-factor which will apply to the community's analyses on these subjects during FY 1975 will still be sufficient to meet the needs of policy-making levels of the US government.

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for producing the analyses listed in category #6 on economic aid to North Vietnam from the USSR and China.

The Community's information on Soviet and Chinese military aid to North Vietnam has never been sufficient to carry out detailed analysis on a current basis -- although some six months or so after the fact a reasonable order of magnitude can be estimated. In FY 1974, the situation was less good than in earlier years,

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FY 1975. Satisfactory analysis of Soviet and Chinese economic aid to North Vietnam, on the other hand, is -- and will continue to be -- possible on a current basis, because

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### III. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT

- A. Despite the reduction of the past year (FY 1974) in US intelligence resources devoted to the Southeast Asia problem, both collection and production plans for FY 1975 are adequate to meet the requirements of this KIQ. The further relatively small drawdowns of collection and production resources which are scheduled to occur during FY 1975 will not change this picture, unless (a) there is a reversion to large-scale warfare in Indochina by the North Vietnamese and (b) in the wake of such a development the top leadership of the US government decides that it needs as much detailed intelligence on Southeast Asia as was available to it for the several years prior to FY 1974.
- B. The National Intelligence Officer recommends no change in current collection and production plans.

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## FY 75 KIQ STRATEGY REPORT

KIQ 41: *Will non-Communist elements in Indochina and Thailand be able to maintain internal stability and will they continue to cooperate with the US?*

### I. COMMUNITY COLLECTION AND PRODUCTION STRATEGY

#### A. Collection

The principal types of information on which a continuous flow of reporting is desired during the fiscal year are:

1. Information on the nature and extent of the Communist effort in South Vietnam to undermine GVN stability by political and/or military means.
2. Information on changes in the economic situation in Indochina and Thailand which could threaten internal stability; information on the impact of economic problems on the combat effectiveness of RVNAF and FANK, and on the willingness of the Thai armed forces to continue to support civilian government.
3. Information on the development of dissatisfaction with President Thieu within the RVNAF, particularly at the middle levels, caused by factors other than economic; similar information on attitudes within the military toward the present governments of Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand.

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4. Changes in the attitudes and strengths of potentially dissident elements other than in the military in Indochina and Thailand -- e.g., the Buddhists in South Vietnam, students and teachers in Cambodia and Thailand, labor in Thailand and Laos.

B. Production

The following types of intelligence analysis and production will be needed to fulfill this KIQ during the fiscal year:

1. Ad hoc current analysis and reporting on this KIQ in the community's daily and weekly publications, and in special memoranda and briefings, will be a high priority requirement throughout the year.
2. At least one in-depth analysis of the dimensions of the Communist political and subversive threat to South Vietnam's political stability will be required.
3. At least one in-depth analysis of key economic problems facing the GVN, of the role of US and other foreign assistance in meeting these problems, and of the relationship of these problems to the GVN's political stability, will be required.
4. At least one in-depth analysis will be required on the impact of US military aid levels on the effectiveness and morale of the RVNAF.

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5. One analytical study will probably be required during the year on the internal strengths and weaknesses of the Cambodian Government (the GKR).
6. One analytical study will probably be required on the stability and prospects for the coalition government in Laos.
7. At least one in-depth analysis will be required on the prospects for constitutional government and for a continuation of civilian government in Thailand.

## II. AGENCIES WORKING ON THIS KIQ

### A. Collection

1. The Central Intelligence Agency accepts on obligation to collect intelligence on all the categories of information listed in section I(A) above. The CIA understands that it will be the primary collector of infor-

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
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
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on categories #1 and #3.

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B. Production

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This will fulfill category #1 of the analysis and production requirements listed in section I(B) above.

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III. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT

- A. Both the intelligence collection plans and the intelligence production plans of the community are adequate to meet the requirements of this KIQ in FY 1975.
- B. The National Intelligence Officer recommends no change in current collection and production programs.

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## FY 75 KIQ STRATEGY REPORT

KIQ 66: *Who are the major producers and traffickers in illicit narcotics, and what are their methods of operation.*

Include the location of their production areas, laboratories and storage facilities, and how and by what routes and timing they move illicit narcotics to the United States?

### I. COLLECTION AND PRODUCTION STRATEGY ON THE KIQ

- A. Collection. The collection of intelligence on KIQ 66 should focus on providing a timely and detailed flow of information on the subjects delineated in the KIQ, especially these dealing with the major producers and major international traffickers of illicit narcotics, particularly heroin and cocaine. The majority of intelligence collected on this KIQ will be actionable field reporting on the modus operandi of specific individuals on the Major International Narcotics Traffickers (MINT) Register for enforcement utilization by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA).
- B. Production. Finished production within the Intelligence Community on this KIQ is limited, in large part because the major user of intelligence on this subject, the DEA,

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
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is more concerned with actionable intelligence. Nonetheless, there will be occasional ad hoc times in the various production vehicles of the respective intelligence producers on the overall production, trafficking and enforcement situation within key geographic areas.

II. COLLECTION AND PRODUCTION OBLIGATIONS ACCEPTED BY EACH AGENCY

A. Collection

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B. Production



tion vehicles.

III. RECOMMENDATIONS

A. The collection and production assets devoted to the KIQ are adequate to meet most of the requirements in FY 1975.

B. In three specific areas, however, the National Intelligence Officer makes the following recommendations:

1. To insure that the KIQ is adequately covered, it is recommended that steps be taken to encourage and increase the exchange of information between the the Intelligence Community and the Drug Enforcement Administration so that priority collection requirements can be identified.

2. Given the involvement of foreign military services with various aspects of the problem, it is recommended

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3. It is further recommended that DEA be invited to participate in USIB deliberations on narcotics matters.

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March 7, 1975

## FY 75 KIQ STRATEGY REPORT

KIQ 67: *How effective are the anti-narcotics programs of the countries in categories 1 and 2 designated by the Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control as of priority interest to the U.S. government's international narcotics control program?\**

Include the willingness of these governments to cooperate with US efforts to expose and prosecute producers, traffickers and their collaborators.

### I. COLLECTION AND PRODUCTION STRATEGY

A. Collection. The collection strategy on KIQ #67 should focus on providing a timely and detailed flow of information on the subjects delineated in the KIQ.

Particular attention should be given to:

Target A: Information on the plans and intentions of the priority countries designated by the Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control. This should not only include their anti-narcotics activities, but also their willingness to commit resources to such activities, and to cooperate and share information with the US in combating the production and flow of narcotics.

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Thailand, Burma, Turkey, France, Pakistan, and Colombia; consideration is being given to adding Ecuador, India, and other countries. It should be noted that countries may be added to or dropped from these categories by the Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control as circumstances dictate.

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Target B: Information on the capabilities and performance of the priority countries in carrying out anti-narcotics activities.

Target C: Information on the degree to which anti-narcotics activities are supported or opposed by politically influential groups within the designated countries.

Target D: Information on the role which licit and illicit narcotics, or activities associated with narcotics, play in the designated countries' economies.

Target E: Information on the existence of corruption within these and other countries which inhibits or prevents effective anti-narcotics programs.


- B. Production. Production within the Intelligence Community on this KIQ will be concentrated in the production vehicles of the respective intelligence agencies. In addition, at least one study -- probably Interagency -- should be undertaken on the KIQ during the fiscal year, possibly including some of the questions raised in KIQ #66.

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KIQ 67 - 3

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to identify those individuals who inhibit or prevent effective anti-narcotics efforts and collaborate with or protect major narcotics traffickers and producers.

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III. RECOMMENDATIONS

- A. The collection and production assets devoted to this KIQ are adequate to meet the requirements of this KIQ during FY 1975. It should be noted, however, that the world-wide scope and unique nature of the KIQ will make it incumbent on all members of the Intelligence Community and DEA to insure that information on the KIQ is provided to the wide range of users and consumers who are involved with the problem.
- B. The National Intelligence Officer recommends that the DEA be invited to participate in USIB deliberations on narcotics matters.

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March 7, 1975  
(Revised)

## FY 75 KIQ STRATEGY REPORT

KIQ 68: *What are the composition, intentions, and capabilities of foreign terrorist or extremist groups?*

*Include their sources of funds and weapons, the possibility of seizure or production and use of weapons of mass destruction (BW-CW as well as nuclear), the issues with which they identify, their relations with other like-minded groups, the extent of government support or opposition, their impact on government policy and stability in their host countries, and any evidence that Moscow or Peking is influencing or rendering direct support to the terrorist groups.*

### I. COMMUNITY COLLECTION AND PRODUCTION STRATEGY

Assessments of the current and likely future performance of foreign terrorist groups are needed, with those of the highest priority being the Fedayeen organizations currently active internationally and the Latin American groups active regionally. Current data are required to support US government programs designed to protect both US and allied facilities and personnel from hostile acts by these groups and to support US policy-makers' efforts to resolve the international terrorist problem.

A. Collection. The principal types of information on which a continuous flow of reporting is desired are:



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1. Refinement of identifying data on the leaders and prospective leaders of foreign terrorist groups such as the following representative groups:
  - a. Middle East  
PFLP  
PFLP-GC
  - b. Latin America  
ERP  
Montoneros
  - c. Worldwide  
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2. Identification of foreign terrorist groups which appear to be developing a capability to affect US interests.
3. Information on the intentions of these groups -- plans for the future, areas of operation, prime targets, modus operandi, issues with which the groups identify, and interrelationships between groups.
4. Data on the capabilities of these groups -- sources of funds and weapons, and the possibility

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of seizure or production and use of weapons of mass destruction (BW-CW as well as nuclear). Data concerning sources of personnel and their recruitment, training, motivation and morale.

5. Information on the impact of the terrorist groups' activities on host or other affected governments' stability and policies toward the US.
6. Evidence that Communist countries are influencing or rendering direct support to the terrorist groups.
7. Information reflecting on the viability of international terrorist organizations.

B. Production. The following types of intelligence analysis and production will be needed during the year.


1. Ad hoc current analysis and reporting on all aspects of the KIQ in the community's daily and weekly publications.
2. Special memoranda and briefings on fast breaking developments on subjects of high interest to US policy-makers.

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3. An analysis of the real level of threat posed to US interests by the principal international terrorist organizations.
4. Analyses of the composition of the terrorist groups with emphasis on the views of their leadership, their plans and intentions, and capabilities to initiate actions inimical to the US.
5. Assessments of the extent of host government support or opposition and of the evidence (if any) of influence and/or direct support from Communist countries.

## II. AGENCIES WORKING ON THIS KIQ

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KIQ 68 - 4

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
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
B. Production

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2. CIA will continue to produce its weekly terrorist report for selected high-level readers.


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8. An assessment will be produced addressing the viability and probable policy evolution of the major Palestinian terrorist organizations over the next 1-3 years.

### III. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT

Both the intelligence collection and production plans of the Community are adequate to meet the requirements of this KIQ and, thus, no changes are recommended. Closer cooperation between the members of the Community, however, will be necessary. During the discussion of this Strategy Report, it was apparent that considerable collection and basic analyses on the various terrorist organizations have been and continue to be done to meet departmental needs. Frequently, only limited distribution of the products of these efforts is made to others concerned

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and the recently published Interagency Memorandum,  
"The Status of Cuban Subversion in Latin America," touches  
briefly on the terrorist problem in that area.

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March 7, 1975

## FY 75 KIQ STRATEGY REPORT

KIQ 69: *What indications are there that the oil exporting countries plan to use their increasing wealth for political or subversive purposes?*

*Include such activities as loans to third parties for the purchase of arms and loans and subsidies to political groupings or national government.*

### I. COMMUNITY COLLECTION AND PRODUCTION STRATEGY

While the potential exists for all oil exporting countries to utilize their increasing wealth to support political or subversive movements within other countries, this KIQ Strategy Report focuses on those countries which at times have exhibited a propensity for using their wealth for purposes inimical to Western interests, e.g., Libya, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran.

A. Collection. The principal types of information on which a continual flow of reporting is needed are:

1. The identity of
  - a. foreign governments and
  - b. foreign political groupsthat are currently receiving financial support from one of these countries for political or subversive purposes.

KIQ 69 - 1

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2. The plans, objectives, capabilities and leadership structure of the entities being subsidized.
3. The identity and motivation of the individuals, groups, or bureaucratic elements in the above countries that are responsible for the decision to support foreign political or subversive action and the interrelationships, if any, between these countries.
4. The identity and motivation of individuals or groups within the governments of countries supporting foreign political or subversive action that are opposed to this support.
5. The form and volume of support to the entities identified in 1 above.

B. Production. The following types of intelligence production will be needed during the year.

1. Ad hoc current analysis on all aspects of the KIQ, particularly the plans of the entities being supported and the volume and origin of support.
2. Periodic assessments of the likelihood of changes in the policies of these countries toward the support of foreign political




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and subversive entities and the relationship between this support and US policies or actions.

II. AGENCIES WORKING ON THIS KIQ


- A. Collection. The information needed in response to this KIQ will require all-source collection efforts.

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B. Production.

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will prepare continuing ad hoc current analyses and reporting on this KIQ in the Community's regular publications.

2. Periodic assessments will be produced to review the factors included in all sub-sections of section I.A. These reports will serve as a base for ad hoc and periodic political and security analyses of changing patterns of these nations' involvement with political and subversive groups.

III. RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING THIS KIQ

During the interagency coordination meeting, there was considerable discussion as to the real need or pertinence of this KIQ given an apparent overlap between it and KIQ 58 on oil exporters' foreign assets and KIQ 68 on terrorism. The working group believed that the elimination of the phrase, "support for terrorist groups," from the subset of the KIQ helped

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to reduce duplication with KIQ 68 but there were still those who questioned the validity of the KIQ. The chairman agreed to raise these points in this section. In one view, there has been little evidence that the increasing wealth of the oil exporting nations has changed their basic policies nor is it likely that it will. Other members felt the potential exists and expressed concern that increasing wealth coupled with resentment toward years of perceived western exploitation, a new feeling of power, and the intoxication engendered by their "successes" (in their eyes) over the past year could lead to more aggressive actions by the oil exporting nations in the realm of political or subversive actions. This could be particularly true if some of these nations' conservative leaders should be replaced by radical elements who have exhibited anti-U.S. attitudes (ala recent developments in Ethiopia).

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